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Abstract. In this paper I present a way of formally representing proper names in 
accordance with a description theory of reference–fixing and show that such a 
representation makes it possible to retain the claim about the rigidity of proper names 
and is not vulnerable to Kripke’s modal objection. 
1. Introduction: What is Descriptivism? 
Let me start with a brief explanation of what constitutes a descriptive theory 
of names. Descriptivism is a semantic theory which has its roots in the 
traditional Fregean approach to meaning. To explain his view on meaning 
Frege uses two metaphors–a meaning is a way of presenting an object 
(Gegebenheitsweise, 1918/1984, p. 359), and it is a way of determining an 
object (Bestimmungsweise, 1914/1980, p. 80). The idea behind this is that a 
speaker, by grasping one of the ways in which an object could be presented, 
has a way of determining that object. Any theory of names could be 
presented in a nutshell as answering two questions – one which concerns 
the semantic criterion for determining the reference of a proper name (‘How 
is the reference of a proper name determined?’), and the other which 
concerns the semantic competence of the speakers (‘What should a speaker 
know in order to know a name?’). And the traditional approach to meaning 
gives exactly the same answer to both these questions– it is information that 
constitutes the semantic criterion for determining the reference, and this 
information should be known by the speakers. Kripke’s two ideas – that the 
descriptive information known by speakers does not determine the 
reference of a name and that the semantic criterion for determining the 
reference could not consist in descriptive information about the reference at 
all – were a turning point in thinking about names and about the semantic 
theory of names. After Naming and Necessity all modern descriptive 
theories of names could be divided into classical or non–classical, 
depending on their acceptance of either the Fregean or the Kripkean 
approach to meaning. Classical descriptive theories of names were defined 
by Kripke (1980, p. 71) as six theses I–VI. Theses I and II from Kripke’s 
definition concern the speaker’s belief, and it is required in thesis III that 
this belief should be true. Descriptivism is a theory of names which 
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postulates that the reference of a name is semantically determined via the 
satisfaction of descriptive properties. That is why on descriptive grounds a 
speaker’s true belief is justified. A justified true belief is, in turn, classically 
understood as knowledge. Kripke stresses (1980, p. 73) that theses V and 
VI and the converses of these theses follow from theses I–IV. In this way 
Kripke’s six theses could be reduced to the following two: 
(1)  The reference of a proper name is semantically determined via the 
satisfaction of a descriptive property; 
(2)  A speaker knows a proper name iff he knows a definite description 
determining the reference of the name. 
I used ‘knows’ in thesis (2) for a speaker’s justified true belief (the 
requirement of Kripke’s I, II and III theses); in order that theses V and VI 
and their converses could follow from (1) and (2), I used ‘iff’ in thesis (2). 
Kripke (1980, pp. 57–8) noticed that if we add possible worlds to 
semantics, thesis (1) could have two interpretations, so descriptivism could 
be understood either as a theory of meaning (theses (1M) and (2M) below), 
or as a theory of reference fixing (theses (1R) and (2R)): 
Descriptive theory of meaning 
(1M) The reference of a proper name in a possible world ݓ is 
semantically determined via the satisfaction of descriptive property ߮ of 
definite description ߡݔ. ߮ which fixes the reference of the name in world 
ݓ; 
(2M) A speaker knows a proper name iff he knows a definite description 
ߡݔ. ߮ which fixes the reference of the name in world ݓ. 
Descriptive theory of reference–fixing 
(1R) The reference of a proper name in a possible world ݓ is 
semantically determined via  the satisfaction of descriptive property ߮ of 
definite description ߡݔ. ߮ which fixes the reference of the name in a 
distinguished world ݓ∗; 
(2R) A speaker knows a proper name iff he knows a definite description 
ߡݔ. ߮ which fixes the reference of the name in a distinguished world ݓ∗. 
If a proper name is synonymous with a description then it has the very same 
modal profile as the description–with respect to possible worlds it changes 
its reference in exactly the same way as the description. But if a definite 
description is used only to fix the reference of a proper name in a 
distinguished (actual) world (1980, p. 55), then the proper name is a rigid 
designator–with respect to all worlds it designates the object which fulfils 
the descriptive content in the distinguished world. In this way the 
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proponents of a descriptive theory of reference–fixing have an easier 
defense of their view against Kripke’s objections, because they need not 
answer the modal argument raised by Kripke against (1M) –they need 
answer only the epistemic and semantic arguments against both (2M) and 
(2R) theses of descriptivism. 
As I said, after Naming and Necessity modern descriptivists have a 
choice – they could accept the classical version of the descriptive theory of 
meaning or reference–fixing (as Glüer, Pagin (2006) or Chalmers (2006) 
did), or they could accept one or both Kripkean ideas and be proponents of 
non–classical descriptivism. For example, Kroon (1987) holds a version of 
the (1R) thesis, but rejects (2R): in his opinion, the reference of a proper 
name ‘NN’ is semantically determined via the satisfaction of the description 
‘the individual referred to by uses of the name NN from which I acquired 
the use of NN’ (1987, p. 1 footnote 1), but speakers need not know this 
description (1987, p. 15). Such descriptivism is not vulnerable at all to 
Kripke’s objections, but could hardly be used to solve puzzles with proper 
names because of the triviality of the reference–fixing description. Maybe 
that is why the majority of proponents of non–classical descriptivism 
(Jakson, 2010, Katz, 1994, Bach, 2002, Justice, 2001, Geurts, 1997) 
preferred to hold versions of the (2M) or (2R) theses, but reject theses (1M) 
or (1R). They accept both Kripkean ideas: that the semantic criterion of 
determining the reference does not consist in descriptive information about 
the reference (but in a kind of baptism), and that descriptive information 
possessed by speakers does not determine the reference, but they 
nevertheless require that speakers should know a description in order to 
know a name. That is why they are obliged to answer the semantic and 
epistemic arguments raised against descriptivism. 
I present a formal representation of proper names in accordance with the 
first thesis of a descriptive theory of reference – only the first theses of both 
descriptive theories are semantic and concern the criterion for determining 
the reference (the second ones are pragmatic and concern the way of 
obtaining a proper name by the speakers). That is why the representation 
presented here can be used by both classical descriptivists and those from 
the non–classical descriptive camp who hold a version of the (1R) thesis. 
According to any version of the descriptive theory of reference, proper 
names designate rigidly and I need to show that the terms formally 
representing names are rigid designators. Besides giving proof that Kripke’s 
modal argument does not affect the account presented here, I need to 
answer circularity objections raised against any version of descriptivism. I 
want to stress that I’m concerned here with the (1R) thesis only, and do not 
propose a developed theory of proper names (I leave open the question of 
how exactly the (2R) thesis could be formulated if we take into account the 
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notion of time). This means that all objections raised against the (2R) thesis 
(Kripke’s semantic and epistemic arguments) stay unanswered here (I 
answer these objections in (Poller in preparation c)). 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section I briefly explain 
how descriptions designate with respect to possible worlds and times. In 
section 3 I explain the key steps of the formal representation of proper 
names. In section 4 I give semantic and syntactic definitions of a language 
with new terms representing names, and finally in section 5 I prove that the 
new terms designate rigidly and have all the properties of rigid designators. 
2. Descriptions and Time 
In my formal representation of proper names I use a language with alethic 
and temporal modalities. As we noted earlier, taking into account possible 
worlds as parameters of evaluation results in a distinction between a 
descriptive theory of meaning and a descriptive theory of reference–fixing. 
Besides the notion of rigidity of proper names, two different ways of 
understanding (1) result in different understandings of the (2) requirement, 
that is, in the question of whether the speaker should know a reference–
fixing description in all the parameters, or in only one distinguished 
parameter. If we add time as another parameter of evaluation, the 
divergences between the two theories become deeper. It seems that there is 
nothing controversial in adding the time parameter to (1M) (and sometimes 
(1M) is formulated with it, cf. Soames 2005, pp. 14–15), but we should be 
more careful with (1R). With a time parameter it could become (1Rt): 
(1Rt) The reference of a proper name in a possible world ݓ and a time ݐ is 
semantically determined via the satisfaction of descriptive property ߮ of 
definite description ߡݔ. ߮ which  fixes the reference of the name in a 
distinguished world ݓ∗ and a time ݐ. 
I will briefly explain why in (1Rt) we talk about a distinguished world ݓ∗ 
and a time ݐ instead of talking about a distinguished world ݓ∗ and a 
distinguished time ݐ∗. Conventionally, definite descriptions are formally 
represented as iota–terms formed via applying the ߡ–operator to a formula 
߮, and they designate with respect to a parameter of evaluation if there is 
only one object which fulfils ߮ in a set assigned to the parameter (otherwise 
iota–terms fail to designate, Fitting, Mendelsohn, 1998, pp. 254, 104). Iota–
terms designate contingently with respect to possible worlds and if you add 
time as another parameter of evaluation they would designate contingently 
also with respect to times. Take, for example, ‘the Pope’. This expression 
designates different people with respect to different times in our world (or 
fails to designate). In order to designate somebody in particular by ‘the 
Pope’ expression, we need to fix a time–parameter, for example, by adding 
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‘present’ to it (getting ‘the present Pope’), or expressing a time explicitly 
(‘the Pope in 1967’). Now the expressions ‘the present Pope’ or ‘the Pope 
in 1967’ designate exactly one person with respect to our world and any 
time. Note that we treat ‘present’ as an indexical ‘now’ which fixes a time–
parameter (cf. Kaplan, 1989, p. 545), but ‘present’ could also be treated as 
an operator of present time which operates on times of evaluation. If 
‘present’ is understood in the latter way, then the definite descriptions with 
it (‘the present Pope’) also designate contingently with respect to times (cf. 
Fitting, Mendelsohn, 1998, pp. 238–9) and do not designate somebody in 
particular. I prefer the former way of understanding definite descriptions, 
and I represent them as a special kind of iota–terms of the form ‘ߡݔ. [௜]߮’, 
where ‘[௜]’ is a notational variant of ܜܐ܍ܖ௜ operator (‘true at ݐ௜’) taken after 
(Rini, Cresswell, 2012). Time operator [௜] fixes a time of evaluation, so a 
definite description ߡݔ. [௜]߮ designates with respect to a world ݓ and any 
time ݐ the very same object designated by iota–term ߡݔ. ߮ and for a world ݓ 
and time ݐ௜ ൬ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ (ߡݔ. [௜]߮) = ܫ〈௪,௧೔〉
௚ (ߡݔ. ߮)൰. That is why in (1Rt) we talk 
about any time ݐ, not distinguished time ݐ∗. 
3 The Formal Representation: Key Steps 
Let us have a look once again at thesis (1Rt). According to it, the reference 
of a proper name is semantically determined via the satisfaction of a 
definite description connected with the name. This means that the 
interpretation of a term which formally represents a proper name (I will call 
it ‘a name–term’) depends on the interpretation of a description which, in 
turn, depends on interpretations of the predicates it contains. In other words, 
interpretation of name–terms and descriptions is calculated and depends on 
the interpretation of predicate constants. 
According to a descriptive theory of reference, one (or some) definite 
description expressing a contingent property was used by speakers to fix the 
reference of a name (cf. Kripke 1980: 75–6, 78). But the majority of model 
domains contain no speakers, and that is why there is no difference in them 
between descriptions which fix a reference of a proper name and 
descriptions which identify the reference (that is why this difference would 
not be formally represented). 
A set of properties which the referent of a proper name has could differ 
with respect to a time and a possible world. Nevertheless, every description 
connected with a proper name NN should contain one common property–a 
property of being called [n], where [n] is a sound or an inscription. Let me 
give an example. Take any proper name, say ‘John’. You know that every 
person with this name has a property, that is, of being called [dʒɒn]. This 
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knowledge is trivial and could be obtained without any reference to extra–
linguistic facts (cf. Recanati, 1993, pp. 161–2). Kripke (1980, p. 70) 
objected that a descriptive theory of reference is circular because “[…] 
whatever this relation of calling is really what determines the reference and 
not any description like ‘the man called 'Socrates'’.” We avoid the 
circularity argument by treating [dʒɒn] as a physical object (a sound or an 
inscription) which belongs to a model domain, not to a language. It is used 
as a mark to distinguish somebody (cf. Mill, 1889/2011, p. 41), but the 
property of ‘being called [dʒɒn]’ is not sufficient to determine the reference 
because a lot of people are called so. 
To represent proper names formally we need a language with a set of 
distinguished predicates ( ଵܰ, ଶܰ, ଷܰ, …) which we will read as ‘called ߙ’, 
‘called ߚ’, etc., where ‘ߙ’ and ‘ߚ’ stand for strings of sounds or inscriptions 
(arguments supporting such a view on verbs of naming could be found in 
(Matushansky, 2008) and in (Geurts, 1997)). I will use the symbol ‘! ݔ. ߮’ 
for iota–terms ߡݔ. ߮ with only one variable ݔ which occurs free in ߮. All 
descriptions ! ݔ. [௜]߮ which we connect with a name–term have a form of 
! ݔ. [௜] ቀ ௝ܰ(ݔ) ∧ ܳ(ݔ)ቁ, where ‘ ௝ܰ’ is a distinguished predicate and ‘ܳ’ is a 
1–place undistinguished, e.g. ‘the (present) president called [oʊˈbɑːmə]’. A 
set of such descriptions will be called ‘Γℒ’ (see section 4, Def.VI.ܵ(ܽ)). 
The other objection of circularity concerns the structure of descriptions 
connected with a name. Kripke (1980, p. 83) noticed that people connect 
definite descriptions with names which in turn contain other proper names, 
so both the descriptive theory of meaning and the descriptive theory of 
reference fixing lead to a vicious circle (cf. Devitt, Sterelny, 1999, p. 55). In 
order to avoid this circularity we need to be sure that the definite 
descriptions connected with a proper name contain no proper names. That is 
why we consider two languages, ℒ and ℒା (ℒ ⊂ ℒା). Let me start with 
language ℒ. All the terms it contains are variables and definite descriptions 
(we will use definite descriptions from ℒ to give interpretation of name–
terms from ℒା). The idea behind the formal representation of proper names 
in accordance with descriptive theory of reference is simple: we let name–
terms (formally representing names) designate through equivalence classes 
of descriptions which designate one and the same object and contain one 
and the same distinguished predicate (relation ℝ, see section 4, 
Def.VI.ܵ(ܿ)). We need this last requirement in order to be able to 
distinguish two co–referring but distinct proper names formally (to 
represent them as two different name–terms). Descriptions designate 
different objects with respect to different worlds, so we need to define an 
equivalence relation not on a set of descriptions Γℒ  but on a set of pairs 
containing a description and a world in which this description designates 
(set Δ, see section 4, Def.VI.ܵ(ܾ)). For example, take two descriptions, ‘the 
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planet called [fɒs fər əs]’ and ‘the planet called [hɛs pər əs]’ (I will use the 
symbol ‘ߛଵ’ for the former and the symbol ‘ߛଶ’ for the latter description). 
Both descriptions, ߛଵ and ߛଶ, designate in our world ݓ, but pairs 〈ߛଵ, ݓ〉, 
〈ߛଶ, ݓ〉 will belong to different equivalence classes because ߛଵ contains the 
predicate ‘called [fɒs fər əs],’ while ߛଶ contains a different predicate, i.e., 
‘called [hɛs pər əs]’. This idea is represented schematically in Graph 1 
below: 
     Graph 1 
 
 
 
 
         
   
 
 
In order to define an interpretation of a name–term ݊௜ I need two functions 
– one which connects ݊௜ with an equivalence class (function ℚஸ, 
Def.VI.ܵ(݁)), and the other which takes an equivalence class and gives the 
object designated by every description in the class (function ॲ, 
Def.VI.ܵ(݀)). I presented this idea schematically in Graph 2 below: 
 
Graph 2 
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In effect, name–terms designate rigidly (I will return to this question in 
section 5) and are not synonymous with descriptions (this is exactly what a 
descriptive theory of reference postulates). The interpretation of a name–
term and the notion of satisfaction of a formula with a name–term are 
defined in the following way (Def.VI. ܵ15, Def.VI. ܵ16): 
Interpretation of a name–term 
if ݊௜ is a name–term and Γℒ ≠ ∅, then ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊௜) = ॲ൫ℚஸ(݊௜)൯; if Γℒ =
∅, then ݊௜ fails to designate in ैஸ (at any 〈ݓᇱ, ݐᇱ〉); 
 
 
 
〈ߛଵ, ݓଵ〉 
〈ߛଵ, ݓଶ〉 
〈ߛଷ , ݓଵ〉 
〈ߛସ , ݓଵ〉 
〈ߛଶ , ݓଶ〉 
〈ߛଶ , ݓଵ〉  
  
‘Phosphorus’ 
‘Hesperus’ 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊௜) =  ॲ൫ℚஸ(݊௜)൯ 
  
ॲ൫ ݁ݍݑ݅ݒ݈ܽ݁݊ܿ݁ ݈ܿܽݏݏ ൯ = 
 
 
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Satisfaction of a formula with a name–term 
if a term ݏ designates at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in ैஸ with respect to ݃, then ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨
(ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ) iff  ै ஸ ௚ ቀ
೏
ೣቁ௪ ௧ ⊨ ߮, where ݀ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ ௚ (ݏ); if a term ݏ fails to 
designate at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in ैஸ with respect to ݃, then ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭ (ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ). 
A name–term–if it designates–designates rigidly (see section 5 for a proof), 
and in the case it does designate, the definition of satisfaction of a formula 
containing this name–term is substantively simplified: 
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. ߮)(݊௜) iff ै
 ஸ ௚ ቀ೏ೣቁ௪ ௧ ⊨ ߮, where ݀ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊௜). 
It follows from this definition that only the referent is relevant for sentence 
truth–conditions (irrespectively of the descriptions identifying it). That is 
why a formula with a name–term could be satisfied even in cases where the 
referent of the term belongs to the extension of a predicate, but does not 
satisfy any descriptions in the time and the world of evaluation. Note that 
the interpretation of a name–term is ‘calculated’ and there are such models 
in which name–terms do not designate. In such cases objects from the 
model domain cannot be distinguished with respect to their properties (this 
means that definite descriptions do not designate in these models, so Γℒ =
∅). Now let me give definitions of languages ℒ and ℒା. 
4. The Formal Representation: Definitions 
The languages ℒ and ℒା are based on a first–order predicate logic with 
identity and descriptions (I followed Fitting, Mendelsohn 1998). I will skip 
all the standard definitions and present the definitions that are specific for a 
formal representation of names. 
Let me start with language ℒ, which contains only two sorts of terms, 
variables and iota–terms. 
Definition I: Alphabet of ℒ 
A first–order language ℒ contains the following symbols: sentential 
connectives ∧, ∨, →, ↔, ~; quantifiers ∃, ∀; an infinite set of individual 
variables ݔଵ, ݔଶ, ݔଷ, …; an infinite set of predicate constants ଵܲ, ଶܲ, ଷܲ, …, 
with a positive integer (an arity), assigned to each of them; the identity sign 
=; the definite descriptions operator ߡ; the abstraction operator ߣ; temporal 
operators of past ۾ and future ۴; an infinite set of temporal operators [௜] 
(‘true at ݐ௜’), where ݅ ∈ ℕ; modal operators □, ; an infinite set of 
distinguished predicate constants ଵܰ, ଶܰ, ଷܰ, …; a set of numerical symbols 
for natural numbers; the left parenthesis (, the right parenthesis ). 
Definition II: Syntax of ℒ 
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Predicate constants and the predicate abstracts defined below are predicates 
of ℒ. The notions of a variable (ܴ1), a predicate constant (ܴ2), an atomic 
formula (ܴ3), ~߮ (ܴ4), (߮ ∧ ߰), (߮ ∨ ߰), (߮ → ߰), (߮ ↔ ߰) (ܴ5), ۾߮, 
۴߮, [௜]߮ (ܴ6), □߮, ߮ (ܴ7), ∀௫߮, ∃௫߮ (ܴ8), ߡݔ. ߮ (ܴ9), (ߣݔ. ߮) (ܴ10), 
(ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ) (ܴ11) are defined in a standard way (compare (Fitting, 
Mendelsohn, 1998): ܴ1–definition 12.1.1 point 1 (p. 248), ܴ3– ܴ5 and ܴ7, 
ܴ8–definitions 4.1.1, 4.1.2 points 1–5 (pp. 81–2), ܴ9–definition 12.1.1 
point 4 (p. 249), ܴ10–definition 9.4.2 point 6A (p. 196), ܴ11–definition 
9.4.2 point 6B (p. 197) and definition 12.1.1 point 10 (p. 249), ܴ6–
definition (27) from (Rini, Cresswell, 2012, p. 90)). 
Definition III: Semantics of ℒ 
A varying domain first–order model ै for ℒ is a structure ै =
〈ࣞ, ܶ, <, ܹ, ܫ〉, such that: 
– ࣞ is a domain function mapping pairs of possible worlds and times 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 
to non–empty sets. The domain of the model is the set ∪ ൛ࣞ〈௪,௧〉: ݓ ∈
ܹ, ݐ ∈ ܶൟ. We write ࣞै for the domain of the model ै and ࣞ〈௪,௧〉 for a 
value of the function ࣞ for an argument 〈ݓ, ݐ〉; 
– ܶ is a set of natural numbers and < (‘earlier then’) is a linear order 
defined on elements of ܶ (a set (ܶ, <) is thought as the flow of time); 
– ܹ is a non–empty set of possible worlds; 
– ܫ is a function which assigns an extension to each pair of an atomic 
predicate of ℒ and a pair 〈ݓ, ݐ〉, where ݓ ∈ ܹ, ݐ ∈ ܶ, in the following way: 
 – if ܳ is a n–place predicate constant, then ܫ〈௪,௧〉(ܲ) ⊆ ࣞै
௡ ; 
 – ܫ〈௪,௧〉(=) = {〈݀, ݀〉 ∈ ࣞै} ; 
let ݃ be a variable assignment (a mapping that assigns to each free variable 
ݔ some member ݃(ݔ) of the model domain ࣞै) and let ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚  be a function 
which assigns an extension to each pair of an atomic predicate or a term of 
ℒ and a pair 〈ݓ, ݐ〉, where ݓ ∈ ܹ, ݐ ∈ ܶ: 
 – if ݔ is a variable, then ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ (ݔ) = ݃(ݔ) for any 〈ݓ, ݐ〉; 
 – ܫ ⊆ ܫ௚ for any ݃; 
the notion of interpretation of terms other than variables, the interpretation 
of predicates, and the satisfaction of formulas in ै are defined as follows: 
ܵ1.  if ܳ is a n–place predicate constant and ݕଵ, … , ݕ௡ are variables, then  
  ै ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨  ܳ(ݕଵ, … , ݕ௡) iff 〈݃(ݕଵ), … , ݃(ݕ௡)〉 ∈ ܫ〈௪,௧〉(ܳ); 
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the notions of satisfaction of ~߮ (ܵ2), (߮ ∧ ߰) (ܵ3), (߮ ∨ ߰) (ܵ4), (߮ →
߰) (ܵ5), (߮ ↔ ߰) (ܵ6), ۾߮ (ܵ7), ۴߮ (ܵ8)  are defined in a standard way; 
ܵ9. if ߮ is a formula, then ै ௚ ௪ ௧ೕ ⊨ [௜]߮ iff ै ௚ ௪ ௧೔ ⊨ ߮; 
the notions of satisfaction □߮ (ܵ10), ߮ (ܵ11), ∀௫߮ (ܵ12), ∃௫߮ (ܵ13) are 
defined in a standard way; 
ܵ14. if ै ௚ ቀ
೏
ೣቁ௪ ௧ ⊨ ߮ for exactly one ݀ ∈ ࣞै, then ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ (ߡݔ. ߮) = ݀; if it 
is not the case that ै ௚ ቀ
೏
ೣቁ௪ ௧ ⊨ ߮ for exactly one ݀ ∈ ࣞै, then ߡݔ. ߮ fails 
to designate at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in ै with respect to ݃; 
ܵ15.  if a term ݏ designates at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in ै with respect to ݃, then ै௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨
(ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ) iff  ै ஸ ௚ ቀ
೏
ೣቁ௪ ௧ ⊨ ߮, where ݀ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ ௚ (ݏ); if a term ݏ fails to 
designate at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in ै with  respect to ݃, then ै௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭ (ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ). 
I will use the symbol ‘! ݔ. ߮’ for the special case of ߡݔ. ߮ terms with only 
one variable ݔ which occurs free in ߮. There are no free variable 
occurrences in ! ݔ. ߮ and due to this if ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ (! ݔ. ߮) is defined, then 
ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ (! ݔ. ߮) = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ᇲ (! ݔ. ߮) for any assignments ݃ and ݃ᇱ. That is why 
instead of ‘ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ (! ݔ. ߮)’ we will write ‘ܫ〈௪,௧〉
 (! ݔ. ߮)’, which should be 
understood as ‘ܫ〈௪,௧〉
௚ (! ݔ. ߮)’ where ݃ is any assignment. 
Now I will expand language ℒ to ℒା by adding name–terms. I will skip 
all syntactical and semantic definitions of ℒା duplicating the definitions of 
ℒ, and will write below only the new ones. 
Definition IV: Alphabet of ℒା 
A first–order language ℒା contains all symbols of ℒ with the addition of an 
infinite set of name–terms ࣨ = {݊ଵ, ݊ଶ , ݊ଷ, … }. 
Definition V: Syntax of ℒା 
The syntax of ℒା is the same as the syntax of ℒ with the addition of the 
following clause: name–term ݊௜ is a term with no free variable occurrences. 
Definition VI: Semantics of ℒା 
Let ै = 〈ࣞ, ܶ, <, ܹ, ܫ〉 be a model of ℒ. A varying domain first–order 
model ैஸ for ℒା is a structure ैஸ = 〈ࣞ, ܶ, <, ܹ, ܫஸ〉, where ܫஸ ↾ ℒ = ܫ. 
Using the already defined properties of ै (Definition III), we define the 
following sets, relations, and functions. 
ܵ(ܽ): set Γℒ  
Set Γℒ  is a set of iota–terms ! ݔ. [௜]߮ of ℒ. ߡݔ. [௜]߮ ∈ Γℒ  iff 1) there is a 
world ݓ ∈ ܹ such that for every time ݐ ∈ ܶ ! ݔ. [௜]߮ designates at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in 
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ै; 2) ߮ = ൫ ௜ܰ(ݔ) ∧ ܳ(ݔ)൯, where ௜ܰ is a distinguished predicate and ܳ is 
an undistinguished predicate. (I will use symbols ‘ߛ௜’, ‘ߛ௝’ for members of 
Γℒ) 
ܵ(ܾ): set Δ 
Δ ⊆ Γℒ × ܹ. 〈ߛ௜ , ݓ〉 ∈ Δ iff for any time ݐ ∈ ܶ ܫ〈௪,௧〉(ߛ௜) is defined. 
ܵ(ܿ): relation ℝ 
ℝ ⊆ Δଶ. 〈ߛ௜ , ݓ〉ℝ〈ߛ௝, ݓ′〉 iff for any time ݐ ∈ ܶ ܫ〈௪,௧〉(ߛ௜) = ܫ〈௪ᇲ,௧〉൫ߛ௝൯ and 
there is the same predicate ௞ܰ in ߛ௜, ߛ௝. 
Let Δ ∕ ℝ be a partition of set Δ by equivalence relation ℝ and [〈ߛ௜ , ݓ〉]ℝ be 
an equivalence class from Δ ∕ ℝ. 
ܵ(݀): function ॲ 
ॲ: Δ ∕ ℝ → ࣞै. For any [〈ߛ௜ , ݓ〉]ℝ ∈ Δ ∕ ℝ, ॲ([〈ߛ௜ , ݓ〉]ℝ) = ݀, where for 
any time ݐ ∈ ܶ ݀ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉൫ߛ௝൯ for any 〈ߛ௝, ݓ〉 ∈ [〈ߛ௜ , ݓ〉]ℝ. 
Let ≤ be any well–ordered relation on a set Δ ∕ ℝ and let 〈Δ ℝ⁄ , ≤〉 be a 
well–ordered set. 
ܵ(݁): function ℚஸ 
ℚஸ: ࣨ → Δ ∕ ℝ. Function ℚஸ for an argument ݊௜ gives an equivalence 
class [〈ߛ௜ , ݓ〉]ℝ in the following way: 
 – for ݊ଵ ℚஸ gives the least element of 〈Δ ℝ⁄ , ≤〉; 
 – for every next element of ࣨ (with respect to an index), ℚஸ gives 
the next element of 〈Δ ℝ⁄ , ≤〉; 
 – in the case there are no next elements in 〈Δ ℝ⁄ , ≤〉, then for a next 
element of ࣨ, ℚஸ gives the least element of 〈Δ ℝ⁄ , ≤〉. 
Semantic rules ܵ1. –  ܵ14. of language ℒା are the same as rules ܵ1. –  ܵ14. 
of language ℒ (except for talking about ܫஸ instead of ܫ); 
ܵ15.  if ݊௜ is a name–term and Γℒ ≠ ∅, then ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊௜) = ॲ൫ℚஸ(݊௜)൯; if 
Γℒ = ∅, then ݊௜ fails to  designate in ैஸ (at any 〈ݓᇱ, ݐᇱ〉); 
ܵ16.  if a term ݏ designates at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in ैஸ with respect to ݃, then 
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ) iff ै ஸ ௚ ቀ
೏
ೣቁ௪ ௧ ⊨ ߮, where ݀ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ ௚ (ݏ); if a term ݏ 
fails to designate at 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 in ैஸ with  respect to ݃, then ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭
(ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ). 
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5. Answering the Modal Argument 
We noted in section 1 that, according to a descriptive theory of reference, a 
proper name is a rigid designator (see (1R)). Let me present a proof that 
name–terms of ℒା are obstinately rigid (they designate the same object with 
respect to all pairs world–time, irrespectively of its existence in possible 
worlds and times (cf. Kripke, 1980, pp. 48–9, 78; Salmon, 2005, p. 34)). 
For names being rigid designators means that any two co–designative 
name–terms should be necessarily co–designative (Kripke, 1980, pp. 3, 4, 
109, 143) and interchangeable in modal contexts (1980, p. 21 footnote 21). 
Besides these two properties of rigid designators, formulas with a name–
term and a modal operator in different scopes should have equivalent truth–
conditions (1980, p. 12 footnote 15). After presenting a proof that name–
terms are rigid, I will prove that they have all these properties of rigid 
designators. 
Let me start with the proof showing that name–terms are obstinately 
rigid. I noted in section 4 that ℒା is based on a first–order predicate logic 
with identity and descriptions taken after (Fitting, Mendelsohn, 1998). 
Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998, pp. 211, 213, 217) defined a term’s rigidity 
as the equivalence of truth–conditions of formulas with the term and □–
operator in different scopes, ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. □߮)(ݏ) ↔ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(ݏ). This 
formula is valid iff ݏ is a obstinately rigid designator for which scope does 
not matter. Let me prove that this formula holds for a name–term. 
Theorem I 
For any name–term ݊, a possible world ݓ, a time ݐ, an assignment ݃, a 
formula ߮, and a model ैஸ, the following formula is valid: ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨
(ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) ↔ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊). 
Proof 
I. Let us assume that ݊ designates in ैஸ with respect to 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 (which 
means that Γℒ ≠ ∅). 
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) ↔ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊)  iff (Def.VI. ܵ6) 
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) and ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊) or  
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭ (ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) and ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊) iff (Def.VI. ܵ16, ܵ10) 
ैஸ ௚ ቀ
೏
ೣቁ௪ ௧ ⊨ □߮, where ݀ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊) and for every world ݓᇱ ∈
ܹ ैஸ௚ ௪
ᇲ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. ߮)(݊) or  
ैஸ ௚ ൫
೐
ೣ൯௪ ௧ ⊭ □߮, where ݁ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊) and there is a world ݓᇱᇱ ∈ ܹ such 
that ैஸ௚ ௪
ᇲᇲ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. ߮)(݊) iff (Def.VI. ܵ16, ܵ10) 
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for every world ݓᇱᇱᇱ ∈ ܹ ैஸ௚ ቀ
೏
ೣቁ ௪
ᇲᇲᇲ௧ ⊨ ߮, where ݀ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊) and  
for every world ݓᇱ ∈ ܹ ैஸ௚ ቀ
೏ᇲ
ೣ ቁ ௪
ᇲ௧ ⊨ ߮, where ݀ᇱ = ܫ〈௪ᇲ,௧〉
ஸ (݊) or 
there is a world ݓᇱᇱᇱᇱ ∈ ܹ such that ैஸ ௚ ൫
೐
ೣ൯௪
ᇲᇲᇲᇲ ௧ ⊭ ߮, where ݁ = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊) 
and  
there is a world ݓᇱᇱ ∈ ܹ such that ैஸ ௚ ቀ
೐ᇲ
ೣ ቁ௪
ᇲᇲ ௧ ⊭ ߮, where ݁ᇱ =
ܫ〈௪ᇲᇲ,௧〉
ஸ (݊). 
Due to ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊) = ܫ〈௪ᇲ,௧〉
ஸ (݊) for any ݓ and ݓᇱ, ݀ = ݁ = ݀ᇱ = ݁ᇱ. Let us 
assume that the first part of the disjunction is false. Let us show that the 
second part of the disjunction is true under this assumption. ݀ = ݀ᇱ, which 
means that the conjunction in the first part of the disjunction is equal to the 
requirement for formula ߮ to be satisfied with respect to any 〈ݓ, ݐ〉. The 
falsity of this requirement means that there is a world ݓᇱ such that ߮ is not 
satisfied with respect to 〈ݓᇱ, ݐ〉. ݁ = ݁ᇱ, which means that the conjunction in 
the second part of the disjunction is equal to the requirement such that there 
is a world ݓᇱᇱ such that formula ߮ is not satisfied with respect to 〈ݓᇱᇱ, ݐ〉. 
We assumed that the first part of the disjunction is false and it follows from 
this assumption that the second part of the disjunction is true. If we assume 
that the second part of the disjunction is false we get the same result. 
II. Let us assume that ݊ does not designate in ैஸ with respect to 〈ݓ, ݐ〉 
(which means that Γℒ = ∅). 
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) ↔ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊)  iff (Def.VI. ܵ6) 
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ (ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) and ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊨ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊) or  
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭ (ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) and ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊). 
݊ does not designate in ैஸ with respect to 〈ݓ, ݐ〉, so ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭
(ߣݔ. □߮)(݊) (Def.VI. ܵ16). This means that the first part of the disjunction 
is false. In order to check if the initial formula is satisfied we need to check 
if the second part of the disjunction is satisfied or not. The first part of the 
conjunction in it is true, so we need to check if also the second part of the 
conjunction is true. 
ैஸ௚ ௪ ௧ ⊭ □(ߣݔ. ߮)(݊) iff (Def.VI. ܵ10) there is a world ݓᇱ ∈ ܹ such that  
ैஸ௚ ௪
ᇲ௧ ⊭ (ߣݔ. ߮)(݊).                          
݊ does not designate in ैஸ with respect to any 〈ݓᇱᇱ, ݐ〉, so ݊ does not 
designate in ैஸ with respect to 〈ݓᇱ, ݐ〉. This means (Def.VI. ܵ16) that 
ैஸ௚ ௪
ᇲ௧ ⊭ (ߣݔ. ߮)(݊), so the initial formula is satisfied.                            ■ 
Let ݊௜, ௝݊  stand for any name–terms. Assuming that they co–designate, 
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ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ (݊௜) = ܫ〈௪,௧〉
ஸ ( ௝݊), it follows from Theorem I and Def.VI. ܵ16, ܵ10 that 
the following formulas (ܽ)– (݀) have equal truth–conditions: 
(ܽ)  □൫λݔ. ߣݕ. (ݔ = ݕ)(݊௜)൯൫ ௝݊൯ 
(ܾ)  λݔ. ൫□ߣݕ. (ݔ = ݕ)(݊௜)൯൫ ௝݊൯ 
(ܿ)  λݕ. ቀ□ߣݔ. (ݔ = ݕ)൫ ௝݊൯ቁ (݊௜) 
(݀)  λݔ. ൫ߣݕ. □(ݔ = ݕ)(݊௜)൯൫ ௝݊൯ 
Equality of the truth–conditions formally represents the claim about the 
interchangeability of co–designative names in modal contexts and the 
insensitivity of modal operators to scopes. We get a similar result if we 
change the modal operator in formulas (ܽ)– (݀) to temporal operators of 
past ۾ and future ۴ (Theorem I and Def.VI. ܵ16, ܵ7, ܵ8). 
6. Concluding Remarks 
I presented a way of formally representing proper names in accordance with 
a description theory of reference fixing. Such a representation makes it 
possible to keep the thesis about the rigidity of proper names and to answer 
objections against the (1R) thesis (the circularity objections). It can be used 
either by classical descriptivists or those of non–classical descriptivists who 
hold a version of the (1R) thesis. The main advantage of this representation 
is that it connects different descriptions with co–designative but different 
proper names, and this feature could be used in solving puzzles with proper 
names (see Poller in preparation a and b). 
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